Preference reversals: Time and again by Alós-Ferrer, C. (Carlos) et al.
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260228788
Preference Reversals: Time and Again
Article  in  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · February 2016
DOI: 10.1007/s11166-016-9233-z
CITATIONS
5
READS
96
4 authors, including:
Carlos Alós-Ferrer
University of Zurich
106 PUBLICATIONS   1,103 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
Georg D. Granic
Erasmus University Rotterdam
14 PUBLICATIONS   38 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
Alexander K. Wagner
University of Vienna
14 PUBLICATIONS   98 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
All content following this page was uploaded by Alexander K. Wagner on 25 February 2018.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
Preference Reversals: Time and Again⇤
Carlos Alo´s–Ferrera Dura–Georg Granic´b Johannes Kernc
Alexander K. Wagnerd
August, 2015
Forthcoming, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Abstract
This paper sheds new light on the preference reversal phenomenon by analyzing decision
times in the choice task. In a first experiment, we replicated the standard reversal pattern
and found that choices associated with reversals take significantly longer than non-reversals,
and non-reversal choices take longer whenever long-shot lotteries are selected. These results
can be explained by a combination of noisy lottery evaluations (imprecise preferences) and
an overpricing phenomenon associated with the compatibility hypothesis. The first cause
explains the existence of reversals, while the second explains the predominance of a partic-
ular type thereof. A second experiment showed that the overpricing phenomenon can be
shut down, greatly reducing reversals, by using ranking-based, ordinally-framed evaluation
tasks. This experiment also disentangled the two determinants of reversals, because impre-
cise evaluations still deliver testable predictions on decision times even in the absence of
the overpricing phenomenon. Strikingly, when unframed ranking tasks were used, decision
times in the choice phase were greatly reduced, even though this phase was identical across
treatments. This observation is consistent with psychological insights on conflicting decision
processes.
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1 Introduction
The concept of preference is of fundamental importance for decision theory and economic analy-
sis. Yet, preferences are not a primitive but a derived object which structures choices as long as
they exhibit some basic consistency, e.g. in the form of the weak axiom of revealed preference. If
choices are consistent, a number of elementary predictions can be derived, which form the basis
for decision theory, microeconomics, consumer research, and judgment and decision making.
One such prediction is that choices should agree with valuations: if a decision maker chooses
one option over another, he should value the former more than the latter.
This common-sense prediction is at odds with observed decisions under risk. The preference
reversal phenomenon, first documented in psychology by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) and
Lindman (1971), describes a situation in which participants are asked to state monetary valu-
ations for a series of lotteries (usually through minimum selling prices), and separately choose
from pairs of those lotteries. The pairs consist of a P -bet, which has a high probability of paying
a moderate amount of money, and a $-bet , which has a low probability of paying a high amount
of money. A preference reversal occurs if either the P -bet is chosen from a pair in which the
$-bet is priced higher or the $-bet is chosen from a pair in which the P -bet is priced higher.
The preference reversal phenomenon is characterized by a high rate of reversals of the first type
(between 40 and 80 percent in most experiments), which are called predicted reversals. Rever-
sals of the second type, termed unpredicted, are less frequent (between 5 and 30 percent). The
asymmetry between both types of reversals is especially problematic, for, if reversals were due
to e.g. participants’ errors, one should expect similar numbers of both types. In other words,
while one could explain away unpredicted reversals as noisy observations, predicted reversals
remain a serious challenge to basic economic analysis.
It is no surprise that preference reversals have received a great deal of attention in the
last half century. After the first replication in economics by Grether and Plott (1979), a large
number of experimental and theoretical studies has shown that the phenomenon is extremely
stable. It has been replicated using hypothetical and real payments, di↵erent payment schemes,
and di↵erent elicitation methods for lottery prices (for a survey, see e.g. Seidl, 2002). Prefer-
ence reversals of this particular form have been documented beyond lottery choice, e.g. in the
field of health utility measurements (Stalmeier et al., 1997; Bleichrodt and Pinto Prades, 1994;
Oliver, 2013). Furthermore, other forms of inconsistencies between di↵erent preference elicita-
tion methods have been established in the literature, including reversals between pricing and
rating (Schkade and Johnson, 1989) as well as discrepancies between certainty and probability
equivalents (Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985; Johnson and Schkade, 1989; Delquie´, 1993). In
addition to their conceptual importance for decision theory, these phenomena are of great rele-
vance for applied economics, since they cast doubts on the validity of e.g. consumer valuations,
and, accordingly, on demand estimations and policy decisions based on those valuations.
The present research provides new evidence on the determinants of preference reversals by
investigating decision times in two separate experiments. This allows us to go beyond existing
accounts of behavioral data and investigate the decision processes underlying reversals. Using
a well-established, stylized fact on decision times (that decisions take longer when the decision
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maker is closer to indi↵erence), we argue that the combination of two standard elements of exist-
ing accounts of preference reversals is enough to explain the pattern of reversals while delivering
testable predictions on decision times. The two determinants are the imprecision of preferences
in the evaluation phase (Schmidt and Hey, 2004; Butler and Loomes, 2007) and the overpricing
of $-bets. The latter can be due to anchoring of evaluations on the largest monetary outcomes of
a lottery (Tversky et al., 1990), which is itself a consequence of the cardinal/monetary framing
of the evaluation phase. An alternative explanation for the overpricing of $-bets is reference
dependence (Sugden, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2008; Lindsay, 2013).1
The main, clear-cut prediction that we obtain for decision times is that choices associated
with reversals of either type are slower than the corresponding non-reversal choices. Our first
experiment reproduced the standard preference reversal pattern and confirmed this prediction.
We employed two di↵erent payment methods, the BDM procedure (Becker et al., 1964) and an
ordinal payment scheme (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Tversky et al., 1990; Cubitt et al., 2004),
showing that our findings are robust to changes in the evaluation task.
Our first experiment hence provided novel evidence in favor of theories based on preference
imprecision and the overpricing of $-bets. In our second experiment, we showed that these two
determinants of preference reversals can be disentangled in the laboratory by “shutting down”
the overpricing phenomenon. This was accomplished by moving away from cardinal elicitation
tasks. Instead, we employed two di↵erent ranking methods (plus a control BDM replication),
one with a price framing, and one where we carefully removed all references to prices. This
experiment helps establish that the imprecision of elicited monetary valuations is an important
key for the existence of reversals, while the overpricing phenomenon causes their asymmetry,
i.e. the predominance of predicted preference reversals. When the latter is eliminated, predicted
reversals become rare, but choices associated with reversals remain significantly slower than
corresponding non-reversal choices. This confirms our interpretation because this prediction
can be shown to arise exclusively from preference imprecision in the choice phase.
Received evidence on preference reversals could potentially be explained by a number of
alternative, “as if” models. The analysis of decision times, however, allows us to put di↵erent
hypotheses on the determinants of preference reversals to a more stringent test than if we
relied on behavioral data only, and further enables us (through predictions arising from one
determinant only) to disentangle the causes of reversals.2
Our research also delivers additional theoretical and methodological insights. On the basis
of our assumptions, we also obtain an additional, surprising prediction, namely that decisions
where the riskier $-bet is chosen without giving rise to a reversal should be slower than those
non-reversals where the P -bet is chosen. This nontrivial prediction arises as a consequence
1 Reference dependence states that a subject’s reference point when asked for a minimum selling price is the
lottery at hand. Exchanging the lottery for a certain amount of cash involves a probabilistic loss which is higher
for the $-bet than for the P -bet leading to a higher stated price for the $-bet. We thank an anonymous referee
for referring us to this strand of literature.
2 The measurement of decision times is a standard tool in psychology (see, e.g., Bargh and Chartrand,
2000). To our knowledge, the first studies in economics employing them to study risky choice were those of
Wilcox (1993, 1994). Decision times were also used by Mo↵att (2005) relying on risky-choice data from Hey
(2001). Rubinstein (2007) advocated the measurement of decision times in large-scale, web-based experiments
to better understand economic decisions. Achtziger and Alo´s-Ferrer (2014) measured response times within a
Bayesian-updating paradigm in order to study intuitive decision making in economic contexts.
3
of the conjunction of imprecise preferences and the overpricing phenomenon, and hence was
predicted for (and observed in) the first experiment but not for the second. A further, striking
observation was that choices in the treatment with unframed ranking-based evaluations were
much faster than those in other treatments, in spite of the fact that choice phases were identical
across treatments. This fact has a simple process-based explanation (which we relegate to the
discussion of that experiment). Last, our design specifically allowed comparing reversal rates
when prices are elicited before the choice phase to reversal rates occurring when prices are
elicited after the choice phase. This comparison, which has not been previously made in the
literature, was motivated by evidence from psychology (see Section 2.3 below) indicating that
choices might sharpen and even modify previously imprecise preferences. In agreement with this
observation, we show that ordering e↵ects, although small, are present in the measurement of
reversals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive our experimen-
tal hypotheses from a simple formal model. Sections 3 and 4 describe the first and second
experiments and their results, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Preference Reversals and Decision Times
In this section we derive our experimental hypotheses from a simplified formal model. We
develop this model only to the extent necessary to obtain predictions on preference reversals and
the associated decision times. In particular, the model is tailored to experiments on preference
reversals and makes no attempt to provide a foundation based on first principles. Rather, we take
the main building blocks directly in as assumptions, including imprecise monetary evaluations
and the overpricing phenomenon.
2.1 Model and Rationale
We consider a choice between a P -bet and a $-bet and the pricing decisions for both bets.
In preference reversal experiments, results refer to a relatively large number of evaluation and
choice decisions. Systematic biases are avoided, e.g. by o↵ering choices between lotteries of sim-
ilar expected values, or counterbalancing the di↵erence in expected values across pairs. Hence,
to obtain experimental hypotheses, it is reasonable to treat the utilities of the bets as random
variables. Specifically, let uP and u$ denote the “true” utilities of the P -bet and the $-bet,
respectively. We assume that, in an experiment, these utilities are drawn from i.i.d. continuous
random variables with some fixed distribution. However, the analysis relies only on the distribu-
tion of utility di↵erences uP   u$. We assume that this distribution has an everywhere positive
density h.3
The first building block of our model is preference imprecision in the evaluation phase. We
follow Schmidt and Hey (2004) and Butler and Loomes (2007), who found that subjects in
preference reversal experiments exhibit imprecise monetary valuations of lotteries. Specifically,
3 Since uP and u$ are i.i.d, uP   u$ and u$   uP have the same distribution. If the distribution of uP and u$
has density v then h = (v ⇤v ), where v (s) = v( s) for all s and the symbol ⇤ denotes the convolution operator.
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Schmidt and Hey (2004) suggested that part of the preference reversal phenomenon might be
due to pricing errors, while choice errors play a minor role.4 Our model incorporates these
observations by assuming a noisy evaluation phase and a relatively noise-free choice phase. The
first assumption states that the pricing of lotteries is a noisy process. Denote by CEP and CE$
the elicited certainty equivalents of the P -bet and the $-bet, respectively.
Assumption 1. CEP = uP + ⇣P and CE$ = u$ + ⇣$, where ⇣P and ⇣$ are independent error
terms with everywhere positive density functions.5
In contrast, the choice phase should be comparatively noise-free. For simplicity, the second
assumption postulates that choices follow the underlying utilities. Write c(P, $) = P if the P -bet
was chosen in the choice task and c(P, $) = $ if the $-bet was chosen.
Assumption 2. c(P, $) = P whenever up > u$ and c(P, $) = $ whenever up < u$.
The second element of our model is the compatibility hypothesis proposed by Tversky et al.
(1988, 1990), according to which attributes that naturally map onto the evaluation scale are
given predominant weight in the evaluation phase. Since the evaluation scale usually refers
to prices, the monetary outcomes of the lotteries might anchor valuations, giving rise to an
overpricing of the $-bet, where a large monetary outcome is salient.6 In other words, since the
$-bet yields a large outcome with moderate probability and the P -bet pays a moderate outcome
with high probability, subjects will tend to state a higher price for the $-bet. This overpricing
phenomenon can be captured by simply assuming a strictly positive mean for the error term
associated with the valuation of the $-bet.
Assumption 3. There is a tendency to overprice the $-bet, i.e. E[⇣$] = K > 0 but E[⇣P ] = 0.
Further, the densities of ⇣P and ⇣$ are symmetric around the means and unimodal.
The last assumption refers to decision times. It is a well-established fact in the psychological
literature that decision times reflect preferences in the sense that hard choices, where the decision
maker is close to being indi↵erent, result in longer decision times than easy choices, where one
option is clearly better (see e.g. Shultz et al., 1999; Sharot et al., 2009; Alo´s-Ferrer et al., 2012).
This has also been observed in the risky-choice studies of Wilcox (1993) and Mo↵att (2005), and
in a study of intertemporal choices by Chabris et al. (2009). To model this e↵ect in a simple
way, we postulate that the choice time DTC only depends on the utility di↵erence |uP  u$|. To
avoid unnecessarily complicating the model, we make the simplifying assumption that decisions
are of two kinds, easy and hard. Easy decisions correspond to utility pairs (up, u$) such that
|uP  u$|     for some   > 0, while utility pairs (up, u$) with |uP  u$| <   lead to hard decisions.
4 See Blavatsky (2009) for a formal model focused on those findings.
5 An alternative interpretation of uP and u$ is hence that they correspond to the expected monetary valua-
tions of the lotteries, in the absence of (over)pricing biases. The second part of the assumption is for technical
convenience. The analysis goes through, with more cumbersome proofs, if the error terms have bounded support.
6 Tversky et al. (1990) used a design with additional choices between the bets and cash amounts and showed
that at least part of the predicted reversals arise because of an overpricing of $-bets. Tversky et al. (1988)
also proposed the prominence hypothesis, which assumes a bias in the choice stage rather than in the evaluation
stage (see also Fischer et al., 1999). Cubitt et al. (2004) investigated a number of alternative hypotheses including
prominence and compatibility and dismissed each of them in isolation, concluding that a combination of hypotheses
would be a more reasonable explanation of their findings.
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Denote by TE = E[DTC | |uP   u$|    ] and TH = E[DTC | |uP   u$| <  ] the expected choice
times for easy and hard decisions, respectively. The next assumption captures the idea that
choice decisions in which a subject is close to indi↵erence between two items are harder than
“obvious” choices.
Assumption 4. Hard choices take longer than easy choices, i.e. TH > TE .
Our assumptions are meant to reflect the basic principles involved in preference reversal
experiments without unnecessarily complicating the exposition and the analysis. Of course, one
could postulate more involved formulations, as e.g. a continuously monotonic relation between
choice times and closeness to indi↵erence. The next section shows that the simple versions
postulated above are enough to provide testable hypotheses.
2.2 Predictions
Our model makes several predictions which can be experimentally tested (all proofs are in the
online appendix). The first one is that predicted reversals should be more frequent than unpre-
dicted ones, that is, we expect the usual pattern of preference reversals. This is unsurprising,
since our model incorporates standard elements which have been developed precisely to explain
this pattern. We view this result simply as a basic test that the model generates reasonable
predictions.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the reversal rate is higher for predicted pref-
erence reversals than for unpredicted preference reversals, i.e. Pr(CE$ > CEP |c(P, $) = P ) >
Pr(CEP > CE$|c(P, $) = $).
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Both kinds of reversals result from noise in
the evaluation phase shifting the evaluations of the lotteries in opposite directions. A reversal
occurs when, due to noisy realizations, the evaluation ranking is reversed with respect to the one
derived from utilities. The overpricing phenomenon helps produce predicted reversals: initially,
the $-bet is ranked lower than the P -bet (u$ < uP ), but overpricing tends to shift the valuation
of the $-bet higher than that of the P -bet. Overpricing, however, makes unpredicted reversals
less likely: the $-bet is initially ranked higher and overpricing tends to increase its evaluation
with respect to the P -bet even more.
We can reformulate the prediction arising from the last proposition straight away as an
experimental hypothesis.
H1 The average rate of predicted reversals (i.e. percentage of reversals over all P -choices) per
subject is larger than the average rate of unpredicted reversals (i.e. percentage of reversals over
all $-choices).
The novel feature in our experimental design is that we record decision times in the choice
task which allows us to look at preference reversals from a di↵erent perspective. Assumption
4 yields two novel predictions for decision times. The first refers to decision times for choices
leading to preference reversals vs. choices not leading to preference reversals.
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Proposition 2. Let DTC denote the decision time in the choice phase. Under Assumptions 1,
2, and 4,
(i) the decision time for a P -bet leading to a preference reversal is longer than the decision time
for a P -bet that does not lead to a preference reversal, i.e. E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) =
P ] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ];
(ii) and the decision time for a $-bet leading to a preference reversal is longer than the de-
cision time for a $-bet that does not lead to a preference reversal, i.e. E[DTC |CEP >
CE$, c(P, $) = $] > E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = $].
The intuition for this result is again simple. Since the origin of reversals lies in the noise
arising in the evaluation process, it is clear that reversals are more likely when utilities were close,
and hence errors in the evaluation phase are more likely to reverse the order of the lotteries.
Decisions where utilities are close are comparatively harder and hence take longer. In other
words, reversals are more likely to involve hard choices than non-reversals, which leads to longer
decision times. This proposition translates into the following experimental hypotheses.
H2a. The average decision time for predicted preference reversals is longer than the average
decision time for comparable non-reversals (i.e. non-reversals where the P -bet is chosen).
H2b. The average decision time for unpredicted preference reversals is longer than the average
decision time for comparable non-reversals (i.e. non-reversals where the $-bet is chosen).
The next prediction is orthogonal to preference reversals. At the same time, it represents an
a priori unexpected feature of the model and is hence especially valuable for its validation. It
concerns decision times when the $-bet was chosen given that it was priced higher compared to
decision times when the P -bet was chosen given that it was priced higher.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the decision time for a $-bet that does not
lead to a preference reversal is longer than the decision time for a P -bet that does not lead to a
preference reversal, i.e. E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = $] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ].
This result seems less intuitive. On the one hand, under overpricing, it is more likely that
$-bets will be priced higher than P-bets than the other way around. Hence, the probability that
a hard (slow) $-bet-choice will result in a non-reversal is larger than the probability that a hard
P -bet-choice will result in a non-reversal. On the other hand, an easy (fast) $-bet-choice is also
more likely to result in a non-reversal than an easy P -bet-choice. The reason for this is that in
the first case u$ > up and overpricing pushes the evaluations further apart, while in the second
case u$ < up and overpricing pushes the evaluations together. Proposition 3 holds because the
relative likelihood for a hard choice to lead to a non-reversal compared to the likelihood for an
easy choice to lead to a non-reversal is larger for $-bets than for P-bets.7 This result leads to
our next experimental prediction.
H3. The average decision time for non-reversals where the $-bet is chosen is longer than the
average decision time for non-reversals where the P -bet is chosen.
7 In particular, the arguments in the proof of this result hold only for non-reversals. No analogous version of
Proposition 3 for reversals can be established.
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2.3 Order E↵ects and Preference Reappraisal
Preference-reversal experiments include a pricing/evaluation phase and a choice phase. Thus
far, the literature has remained silent on order e↵ects, i.e. on whether there is any di↵erence
between experiments where the choice phase precedes the evaluation phase, and experiments
where the order of the tasks is reversed. Preference reversals have been established using either
of the two possible orderings.
We argue, however, that order e↵ects need to be taken into account. The reason is that,
as discussed above, imprecise preferences have been identified as one of the factors driving
preference reversals. If preferences are imprecise, a large literature in psychology indicates that
they might become more precise, or be generally altered, by the mere act of making choices. In
the classical Free-Choice Paradigm (Brehm, 1956), subjects first face a rating (ranking) task,
then a choice task, and finally another rating (ranking) task identical to the first one. The
chosen options are usually evaluated more positively in the second rating (ranking) task while
the options that were not chosen tend to be evaluated more negatively.8 According to Cognitive
Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957), this happens because in the reevaluation phase subjects
attempt to reduce the tension between the negative aspects of a chosen option and the positive
aspects of an option that was not chosen. Self-Perception Theory (Bem, 1967), on the other
hand, attributes this phenomenon to the fact that subjects learn their preferences better by
making choices and hence ratings (rankings) in the second phase more closely resemble the
“true preferences”. This raises the question of whether preference reversals are a↵ected by the
order of valuation and choices. More precisely, if preference reappraisal occurs during the choice
phase, there should be fewer preference reversals if the valuation task follows the choice task.
This yields an additional hypothesis.
H4. Preference reversals are reduced if the valuation task follows the choice task, compared to
the opposite ordering.
More generally, and in view of the discussion above, our expectation was that e↵ects would
in general be more clear when considering post-choice evaluations than when relying on pre-
choice ones. For example, if one relies on self-perception theory, classifying choices as reversals
or non-reversals on the basis of pre-choice evaluations will result in some false classifications,
e↵ectively adding more noise to all measurements. However, since preference reversals have
been established in the literature using both possible task orderings, we expected order e↵ects
to be subtle. The di↵erence should be more clear for unpredicted reversals, because, if those are
purely due to noise, any reduction of noise in the evaluation task should eliminate at least part
of them.
8 Although this classical task has recently been shown to be a↵ected by statistical biases (see Alo´s-Ferrer
and Shi, 2015, and the references therein), improved versions of the task have meanwhile re-established the basic
e↵ect. See e.g. Alo´s-Ferrer et al. (2012).
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3 Experiment 1: Preference Reversals and Decision Times
The objective of our first experiment was to test our experimental predictions, as derived in
Section 2, with regard to both choices and decision times. This would allow us to conclude that
the combination of imprecise preferences in the evaluation phase and an overpricing phenomenon
arising from the compatibility hypothesis is able to explain received evidence on preference
reversals while at the same time fitting novel evidence on process data.
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
We followed a between-subject design comprised of three independent, consecutive single-decision
making parts. The first and third phases were evaluation tasks, while the second, intermediate
phase contained the choice task. This way, we can consider two kinds of preference reversals. On
the one hand, we have “Price-Choice Reversals” which occur comparing the evaluations in the
first phase and the choices in the second phase. On the other hand, we have “Choice-Price Re-
versals” which occur comparing the evaluations in the third phase and the choices in the second
phase. Each of our Hypotheses H1 to H3 can be tested either on Price-Choice or Choice-Price
reversals (or non-reversals), and we will report the results for both possibilities, keeping in mind
that we expect clearer results for the Choice-Price ordering. Comparing both orderings allows
us to test Hypothesis H4.
The stimuli were 40 di↵erent lotteries, which are presented in the online appendix. Each of
the pairs in the choice task contained one P -bet and one $-bet from this set of lotteries, with
the former being defined by a high probability of winning a moderate amount of money and the
latter being defined by a low probability of winning a high amount of money.9
We employed a pricing method for the evaluation of lotteries in phases 1 and 3. Participants
were asked to state their minimum selling price for each of the 40 lotteries which were presented
in fully randomized order (“State the lowest price for which you are just willing to sell the
presented lottery.”). Subjects were only allowed to state prices between e2 (the lower amount
to win) and the higher amount to win. An example screen display for the pricing tasks is shown
in the online appendix. The colors in the pie charts (green and blue) were counterbalanced
across subjects. In phase two, the choice task, subjects faced the 20 lottery pairs sequentially
and had to choose the lottery they would prefer to play out. See the online appendix for an
example screen of the choice task. The order of the pairs and the onscreen position of the
P -bet (i.e. left or right) was randomized. For each choice, we recorded the individuals’ decision
times as the time elapsed between the presentation of the lottery pair and clicking the button
(“This lottery”) underneath one of the two lotteries. After the three tasks, participants filled
in a questionnaire containing various questions on their statistical knowledge, sociodemographic
background, and personality attitudes.
9 Of the 20 lottery pairs, pairs 3 to 8 were such that the expected value of the P -bet was higher than the
expected value of the $-bet (with a di↵erence between e1.00 to e3.40). Pairs 9 to 14, which most closely resemble
the ones commonly used in the literature, had roughly equal expected values. In pairs 15 to 20, the $-bet had
a higher expected value than the P -bet (di↵erence between e1.60 to e4.80). Finally, lottery pairs 1 and 2 were
such that one bet dominated the other strictly and were only included as a basic rationality check. Only 2 out
of 141 subjects chose one of the two strictly dominated lotteries in phase 2. These two lottery pairs are therefore
excluded from the analysis.
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All three tasks were incentivized. Payo↵s were determined independently for each task after
completion of the ex-post questionnaire to prevent spillover e↵ects between tasks (e.g. through
wealth e↵ects). The two treatments in this experiment, BDM and OrdPM, di↵ered only in the
payment scheme used in the pricing tasks (phases 1 and 3). The former used a BDM payment
scheme (Becker et al., 1964), and the latter a variant of the Ordinal Payment Method (Goldstein
and Einhorn, 1987; Tversky et al., 1990; Cubitt et al., 2004). We included these two treatments
to ensure that our results were robust with respect to the elicitation method.
The two schemes determined the payment in an evaluation task as follows. In the BDM
treatment, after one of the 40 lotteries was picked at random the computer drew a price from
a uniform distribution over the interval ]2, A[, where A denotes the higher of the two amounts
to win. If this price was higher than or equal to the price stated by the subject, the subject
received this amount. If it was lower, the subject played the lottery and the payment was the
realized outcome of that lottery. This was done separately for each pricing task. In the OrdPM
treatment, two lotteries were chosen at random. The more highly priced lottery of the two
was then played out and the realized outcome was the payo↵ for this phase (in case of a tie,
the computer chose one at random). As in the BDM treatment, this procedure was conducted
separately for the two pricing phases. Note that under the ordinal payment scheme, the absolute
prices do not play a role, but only the induced ordering matters.
The payment method for the choice task in phase 2 was identical in both treatments. One
of the 20 lottery pairs was picked at random, then the lottery the subject had chosen from this
pair was played out and the realized outcome of that lottery was the payment for this round.
The total payment a participant received in the experiment was the sum of realized payo↵s in
the three decision tasks.
3.2 Procedures
Before the experiment started, participants were briefly informed that the session consisted of
three decision tasks, that payment for each task was partly determined by their decisions and
partly by luck, that the tasks were paid independently of one another and that lotteries from each
phase were not played out before the end of the experiment. In addition, four control questions
had to be answered, using pencil and paper, before the start of the experiment to ensure that
participants understood the concept of a lottery and its pie chart representation. Detailed
instructions about each individual decision-making task (phase 1 to 3) and how payments would
be determined in each phase were handed to the participants prior to the start of each phase.
The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were university
students with majors other than psychology and economics. Each student participated in only
one session. We conducted 7 sessions with a total of 141 participants (91 female). Of those, 67
were allocated to the BDM treatment and 74 to the OrdPM treatment. A session lasted about
2 hours with average earnings of e24.76 in the BDM treatment and of e23.03 in the OrdPM
treatment.
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Figure 1: Average reversal rate per individual in Experiment 1.
Note: Reversal rates for the Price-Choice (dark bars) and Choice-Price (light bars) task order-
ings. Error bars depict the 95 percent confidence interval.
3.3 Results of Experiment 1
As a first illustration, Figure 1 displays the average reversal rates in the BDM and the OrdPM
treatments in Experiment 1 (the percentage of P -bet choices in the BDM and OrdPM treatment
was 69.6%, and 65.6%, respectively). The reversal rate is simply the number of reversals of any
kind divided by the number of lottery pairs; the rate of predicted (unpredicted) reversals is
computed as the number of predicted (unpredicted) reversals divided by the number of P -bet
choices ($-bet choices). It is already apparent from Figure 1 that the rate of predicted reversals
is higher than that of unpredicted reversals, that measuring reversals with respect to post-
choice attitudes decreases the rates, possibly by reducing noise, and that there might be some
minor di↵erences between treatments. We now proceed to test for these observations and our
experimental hypotheses.
Predicted vs. unpredicted reversals (H1). We conducted two-sided Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
(hereafter WSR) tests to assess whether the rate of predicted reversals was higher than the rate
of unpredicted reversals. We computed the predicted and unpredicted preference reversal rates
for each subject individually. The rates for predicted reversals were significantly higher than the
rates of unpredicted reversals for both treatments and both possible task orderings (BDM Price-
Choice, N = 60, z = 4.170, p < 0.0001; BDM Choice-Price, N = 60, z = 5.140, p < 0.0001;
OrdPM Price-Choice, N = 69, z = 4.585, p < 0.0001; OrdPM Choice-Price, N = 69, z = 3.595,
p < 0.0005).10 This confirms Hypothesis H1.
Order e↵ects (H4). In the BDM treatment, the rate of unpredicted reversals was significantly
lower when prices were elicited after choices (Choice-Price) than when they were elicited before
choices (Price-Choice) (two-sided WSR test, N = 61, z =  3.014, p = 0.003). In the OrdPM
treatment, the same e↵ect was observed (N = 67, z =  2.70, p = 0.007) after exclusion of four
10 The tests for reversal rates include of course only the participants for which both rates can be computed.
For instance, if a participant never chose a $-bet, no rate of unpredicted reversals can be computed.
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Figure 2: Average decision time per individual in choice task of Experiment 1.
Note: Predicted reversals are compared to non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen, unpre-
dicted reversals to non-reversals where the $-bet was chosen. Error bars depict the 95 percent
confidence interval.
extreme data points.11 There were no significant di↵erences in the rate of predicted reversals
(BDM, N = 66, z =  0.465, p = 0.642; OrdPM, N = 72, z = 1.090, p = 0.276). Since
unpredicted reversals are essentially due to noise, this is consistent with the interpretation that
measuring reversals through post-choice evaluations reduces noise.
Treatment e↵ects (reversals). We compared the individual reversal rates across treatments
using Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests. We found a significantly lower rate of predicted reversals
when prices are elicited after choices but not when prices are elicited before choices (Price-Choice,
z = 1.49, p = 0.135; Choice-Price, z = 0.42, p = 0.058). There were, however, no significant
di↵erences for unpredicted reversals (Price-Choice, z = 1.90, p = 0.678; Choice-Price, z =  0.88,
p = 0.380).
11 Four participants made only one $-bet choice yielding an unpredicted reversal in choice-price but not in
price-choice, resulting in increases of 100% in the reversal rate. Including these four data points, the e↵ect is not
significant anymore (N = 71, z =  1.339, p = 0.181).
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Figure 3: Average non-reversal decision time per individual in choice task of Experiment 1.
Note: Choices classified as non-reversals according to the indicated task ordering, Price-Choice
(left) and Choice-Price (right). Error bars depict the 95 percent confidence interval.
Decision times and reversals (H2). Figure 2 displays the decision times for reversals and
comparable non-reversals for both treatments and both task orderings. Each type of reversal
is compared with the correct counterfactual, i.e. predicted reversals are compared with non-
reversals where the P -bet was chosen, and unpredicted reversals with non-reversals where the
$-bet was chosen.
Two-sided WSR tests confirmed that predicted reversals involved significantly longer decision
times than comparable non-reversals, both for Price-Choice and for Choice-Price, both for the
BDM (Price-Choice N = 61, z = 2.758, p = 0.006; Choice-Price, N = 54, z = 3.625, p < 0.0005)
and the OrdPM treatments (Price-Choice, N = 66, z = 2.894, p = 0.004; Choice-Price, N = 57,
z = 2.987, p = 0.003).12 Unpredicted reversals were also associated with significantly longer
decision times in the OrdPM treatment (Price-Choice, N = 39, z = 2.854, p = 0.004; Choice-
Price, N = 22, z = 1.883, p = 0.060), but there were no significant di↵erences for unpredicted
reversals in the BDM treatment (Price-Choice, N = 31, z = 0.950, p = 0.342; Choice-Price,
N = 17, z =  0.947, p = 0.344).
Decision times and non-reversals (H3). Non-reversals were clearly slower when the $-bet was
chosen than when the P -bet was chosen (see Figure 3). The di↵erence was highly significant
independently of whether choices were declared non-reversals according to pre-choice or post-
choice evaluations, for both the BDM treatment (Price-Choice, N = 56, z = 3.242, p = 0.001;
Choice-Price, N = 51, z = 2.995, p = 0.003) and the OrdPM treatment (Price-Choice, N = 64,
z =  3.681, p < 0.0005; Choice-Price, N = 59, z =  3.204, p = 0.001).
12 Every test on decision times was conducted for the population of subjects for which the involved average
decision times could be computed. For instance, if a subject did not display any unpredicted reversal, no decision
time can be computed for this category.
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3.4 Regression Analysis for Experiment 1
We conducted a random-e↵ects panel regression analysis (with standard errors clustered at the
subject level) to further investigate the relation between preference reversals and decision times,
and to further test our hypotheses while controlling for a number of natural variables, e.g.
individual and lottery-pair covariates. Since decision times are always positive, we used the log
of decision times (logDT ) as the dependent variable. For each treatment, we report a regression
including a dummy variable for Price-Choice reversals and an analogous one with a dummy
variable for Choice-Price reversals (see Table 1). We also ran a number of additional regressions
and found the main e↵ects to be robust (in magnitude and significance) to the inclusion or
exclusion of additional control variables.
The regressions include dummies for choices which were part of reversals, for $-bet choices,
and the interaction thereof. Hence we can make any comparison among reversals and non-
reversals where the $-bet or the P -bet was chosen, either directly through specific regression
coe cients or via appropriate postestimation tests, which are also reported in the table.
Predicted reversals vs. non-reversals. Hypothesis H2a states that decision times for pre-
dicted preference reversals should be longer on average than decision times for comparable non-
reversals, i.e. non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen. Since a $-choice dummy is included,
the comparison between predicted reversals and non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen cor-
responds to the reversal dummy in the regression, which is highly significant and positive for
both regressions for the OrdPM treatment, and for the Choice-Price regression for the BDM
treatment. This indicates that predicted reversals took longer than comparable non-reversals,
confirming Hypothesis H2a.
Unpredicted reversals vs. non-reversals. Hypothesis H2b states that unpredicted reversals
should take longer than non-reversals where the $-bet was chosen. The di↵erence between both
types of choices corresponds to  Reversal+ $ Choice⇥Reversal, which is highly significant and pos-
itive in both regressions for the OrdPM, confirming Hypothesis 2b. However, the postestimation
tests are not significant for the BDM treatment.
Comparison of non-reversals. According to Hypothesis H3, non-reversals where the $-bet
was chosen should take longer than non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen. Since reversals
dummies are included, this comparison corresponds to the $-choice dummy, which is highly
significant and positive for all four regressions. Hence, conditional on the absence of a preference
reversal, $-bet choices took longer, confirming Hypothesis H3.
Controls: Lotteries. We included a number of covariates in order to control for di↵erences in
the lottery pairs. The absolute value of the di↵erence in expected values of the P -bet and the
$-bet (Di↵EV) had a weakly significant negative e↵ect in both treatments. We further included
the absolute di↵erence in the prices stated for the lotteries in phases one and three (StatedDi↵-
1, StatedDi↵-3) as a rough measure of how similar (or di↵erent) the participant viewed the
lotteries within a pair. Both were highly significant in the OrdPM treatment, but essentially
not significant in the BDM treatment.
The ratio of the two higher amounts to win in the $-bet and the P -bet (Ratio) had a
significant positive e↵ect in both treatments. This e↵ect has a direct interpretation. Given our
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Table 1: Random-e↵ects panel regressions for decision times, Experiment 1.
Treatment BDM BDM OrdPM OrdPM
Order P-C C-P P-C C-P
ReversalPC 0.018 0.078⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.025)
ReversalCP 0.083⇤⇤⇤ 0.109⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.027)
$-Choice 0.127⇤⇤⇤ 0.155⇤⇤⇤ 0.126⇤⇤⇤ 0.151⇤⇤⇤
(0.054) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026)
$-Choice -0.097 0.107⇤⇤
⇥ReversalPC (0.073) (0.052)
$-Choice -0.189⇤⇤ 0.058
⇥ReversalCP (0.095) (0.064)
Di↵EV -0.023⇤ -0.022⇤ -0.021⇤⇤ -0.023⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Ratio 0.041⇤⇤⇤ 0.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
StatedDi↵-1 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
StatedDi↵-3 -0.010 -0.011⇤ -0.011⇤⇤⇤ -0.011⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Round -0.008⇤⇤⇤ -0.008⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.286⇤⇤ -0.290⇤⇤ -0.156⇤⇤ -0.151⇤⇤
(0.113) (0.113) (0.072) (0.071)
Position 0.016 0.015 -0.012 -0.009
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
Color -0.021 -0.019 0.088 0.084
(0.111) (0.112) (0.070) (0.068)
Constant 2.666⇤⇤⇤ 2.649⇤⇤⇤ 2.563⇤⇤⇤ 2.556⇤⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.105) (0.073) (0.072)
Nr. Obs. 1340 1340 1480 1480
Nr. Groups 67 67 74 74
R2-Overall 0.103 0.101 0.118 0.119
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Postestimation tests
Reversal -0.079 -0.106 0.185⇤⇤⇤ 0.167⇤⇤⇤
+($-Choice⇥Reversal) (0.072) (0.094) (0.045) (0.056)
Note: All regressions are random-e↵ects panel estimations, with log decision time as dependent
variable. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.1.
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construction of lottery pairs, a larger ratio translates into the high amount to win being much
larger in the $-bet than in the P -bet, which makes the $-bet more attractive on the monetary
domain. At the same, the probability to win the high amount is much larger for the P -bet than
for the $-bet, which makes the P -bet more attractive on the probability domain. This tradeo↵
leads to “more di cult” decisions which in turn lead to longer response times.
Other controls. Decision time measurements in repeated tasks usually capture a learning
e↵ect as participants gain familiarity with the interface. We controlled for this e↵ect by including
the round in which the choice was made as a regressor (Round). This was significantly negative
in both treatments. A dummy variable controlling for gender (Female) was also significant in
both treatments. Finally, we controlled for onscreen position (Position) of the P -bet and the
$-bet and for the colors used in the pie-chart (Color) to verify that these factors did not influence
the results. As expected, these variables never had significant e↵ects.
3.5 Discussion of Experiment 1
The analysis of the data confirms our predictions as derived in Section 2. First, the rate of
predicted reversals is clearly higher than the rate of unpredicted ones, in agreement with previous
experiments. Second, preference reversals appear to involve longer decision times. This e↵ect is
clear for an ordinal-based elicitation of prices; in the BDM treatment, the e↵ect is also present
albeit less pronounced. Third, in both treatments we found that $-bet choices which are part of
non-reversals take significantly longer than P -bet choices part of non-reversals.
In view of the evidence, we conclude that the data is compatible with the idea that pref-
erence reversals arise from the combination of two factors. First, as pointed out by Schmidt
and Hey (2004) and Butler and Loomes (2007), monetary valuations of lotteries are typically
imprecise, and hence preference elicitation through pricing tasks is much noisier than actual
choices. Second, as summarized by the compatibility hypothesis (Tversky et al., 1988, 1990),
the use of pricing tasks causes an overpricing phenomenon which anchors up the evaluation of
bets with a saliently high monetary outcome. These observations produce testable hypotheses
for both behavioral data and decision times once we incorporate the observation that easier
choices (where the alternatives are farther away from indi↵erence) are faster (e.g. Wilcox, 1993;
Shultz et al., 1999; Mo↵att, 2005).
Regarding ordering e↵ects, we observe small but systematic di↵erences suggesting that a
Price-Choice ordering, where the evaluation task precedes actual choices, might be noisier than
the opposite order, hence producing both higher reversal rates and slightly less clear e↵ects.
This is compatible with self-perception theory (Bem, 1967), which holds that actual choices
serve as “self-signals” that help reduce noise in future evaluations of alternatives.
Last, we observe small but definite treatment e↵ects, pointing out that price evaluations
conducted through the BDM “price-list” scheme might be noisier than those conducted according
to a more intuitive, ordinal-like scheme. This is reflected by the fact that reversal rates (especially
of unpredicted reversals, which are presumably due to noise) are higher in the BDM case. It is
also compatible with the general observation that e↵ects are often more clearly observed in the
OrdPM treatment than in the BDM one.
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4 Experiment 2: Eliminating Reversals
The objective of our second experiment was twofold. First, we wanted to show that the over-
pricing phenomenon can be next to eliminated by using ordinal, ranking-based evaluation tasks.
Second, this manipulation would allow us to disentangle the two building blocks of our model.
The absence of the overpricing phenomenon should result in a reduction of predicted preference
reversals, while the assumption of imprecise preferences still delivers predictions on decision
times.
4.1 Motivation and Hypotheses
In our first experiment we found that the method used to elicit participants’ minimum selling
prices a↵ects the rate of preference reversals. According to the compatibility hypothesis, pre-
dicted reversals are more frequent because participants focus more on monetary outcomes when
their preferences are elicited through prices. Notably, predicted preference reversals were also
more frequent in the OrdPM treatment, where the use of prices in the evaluation task was sim-
ple framing, with no direct monetary consequences. This raises the natural hypothesis that the
overpricing phenomenon predicted by the compatibility hypothesis arises due to a price-based,
cardinal framing (i.e., a “rating task”) in the evaluation phases. As a consequence, moving away
from a cardinal evaluation task towards a more natural, ordinal-based one (a “ranking task”)
should greatly reduce the rate of predicted reversals (given that behavior in the choice phase
does not change).
Specifically, suppose that, by employing a ranking-based evaluation task, we were able to
shut down the decision process responsible for the overpricing phenomenon. In terms of the
model in Section 2, this would imply K = 0 in Assumption 3. It is easy to revisit our theoretical
predictions and derive new experimental hypotheses for such a situation. First, Proposition
1 crucially depends on Assumption 3, and hence we would not expect Hypothesis H1 to hold
in this setting. Although from the point of view of the model we would expect no di↵erences
in reversal rates, this rests upon the implicit assumption that there is no other (second-order)
latent process causing unpredicted reversals. Even if this was the case, a conservative hypothesis
derived from our theoretical analysis is that the rate of predicted preference reversals should be
greatly reduced in comparison to treatments with price-framed evaluations.
H5. The rate of predicted preference reversals is lower if ordinal, ranking-based evaluation tasks
are used than if rating-based tasks are used.
Hypothesis H5 is also in line with previous findings in the literature. Ordinal-based evalua-
tion tasks reduce the di↵erence between the choice task and the evaluation task. For example
Bateman et al. (2007) show that a ranking task reduces predicted reversals, although the ranking
task they use is not directly comparable to ours (see Section 4.6).
The first decision-times predictions spelled out in Proposition 2 do not depend on Assumption
3. Hence, independently of whether evaluation tasks are based on ratings or rankings, we would
expect Hypotheses H2a/b to hold.
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H6a/b. Even if ordinal, ranking-based evaluation tasks are used, choices associated with pre-
dicted preference reversals take longer than P -bet choices associated with non-reversals, and
choices associated with unpredicted preference reversals take longer than $-bet choices associ-
ated with non-reversals.
Proposition 3 depends on Assumption 3. If K = 0, we would a priori expect no di↵erences
in the decision times associated with non-reversals where the P -bet or the $-bet was chosen.
H7. If ordinal, ranking-based evaluation tasks are used, the average decision time for non-
reversals where the P -bet is chosen is not di↵erent from the average decision time for non-
reversals where the $-bet is chosen.
4.2 Design of Experiment 2
The setup of the second experiment was identical to Experiment 1, with the exception of the
evaluation tasks. We used two di↵erent ranking-based tasks, meant to shut down the overpricing
decision processes, and one BDM task as a control. In each of the three treatments, presentation
of lotteries was such that participants faced a total of six blocks consisting of six lotteries each,
i.e. a total of 18 pairs.13 In the Rank-Unframed treatment, we used a purely ranking-based task.
Participants were asked to assign ranks (from most preferred to least preferred) to the lotteries
according to how much they would like to play each lottery, separately for each block. Most
importantly, we did not make any reference to prices (see the online appendix for an example
screen display of the two ranking treatments). In this sense, the task was unframed. The Rank-
Framed treatment was programmed identically. The only di↵erence was in the experimental
instructions. Participants were asked to rank the lotteries (from 1 to 6) according to their
minimum selling price, separately for each block. However, they were not asked to type in or
otherwise state the prices, but merely to think about them and use them for the ranking. Finally,
in the BDM2 treatment, participants had to complete a pricing task that was identical to the one
in the BDM treatment in Experiment 1, with the only exception that (for comparability with
the other treatments) lotteries were presented one after another in three blocks of six lotteries
each. Again, colors and onscreen positions of the lotteries were completely randomized in all
treatments.
As in Experiment 1, all three tasks were incentivized and payo↵s for each task were deter-
mined independently. Payo↵s for the evaluation task of the BDM2 and the choice tasks of all
three treatments were determined in the same way as in Experiment 1. Payo↵s for the eval-
uation phases for Treatments Rank-Unframed and Rank-Framed were determined as follows.
First, the computer picked one of the six blocks at random. From the six lotteries contained in
that block, the computer again randomly picked two. The one that had been ranked higher by
the participant was then played out and the participant received the outcome of that lottery as
payment for that round. In all three treatments, payments were determined and presented to
participants only after all three tasks had been completed.
13 We used 18 of the lottery pairs from Experiment 1, excluding the two pairs which contained stochastically
dominated lotteries.
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Since in both ranking treatments there was no actual “pricing” task, we will refer to the two
possible task orderings for these treatments as “Rank-Choice” and “Choice-Rank”.14
4.3 Procedures
We followed the same procedures as in Experiment 1. We conducted 12 sessions with a total of
215 participants (102 female). Of those, 73 were allocated to the Rank-Unframed treatment, 73
to the Rank-Framed treatment, and 69 to the BDM2 treatment. Sessions in the Rank-Unframed
treatment lasted roughly an hour with average earnings of e23.36. Sessions in the Rank-Framed
treatment lasted one hour and 20 minutes with average earnings of e24.07, while sessions in the
BDM2 treatment lasted about 2 hours with average earnings of e28.44.
4.4 Results of Experiment 2
Figure 4 shows the average reversal rates for all three treatments for both Price/Rank-Choice
and Choice-Price/Rank reversals (the percentage of P -bet choices in the BDM2, Rank-Framed,
and Rank-Unframed treatment were 69.4%, 66.7%, and 66.2%, respectively). As before, the
rate of predicted (unpredicted) reversals is computed as the number of predicted (unpredicted)
reversals divided by the number of P -bet choices ($-bet choices). The basic trends are already
apparent. The rate of predicted reversals was enormously reduced in both ranking treatments to
the extent of dropping below the rate of unpredicted reversals. Measuring reversals with respect
to post-choice attitudes does not have an e↵ect on the reversal rates.
BDM replication. The first observation is that, as expected, there is no qualitative di↵erence
between the results of Treatment BDM2 and Treatment BDM of Experiment 1. For instance,
in Treatment BDM2 the rates of predicted reversals are significantly higher than the rates of
unpredicted reversals (Price-Choice, N = 68, z = 4.495, p < 0.0001; Choice-Price, z = 4.585,
p < 0.0001).
Reduction of predicted reversals (H5). Kruskal-Wallis tests confirmed that the rate of pre-
dicted reversals was significantly di↵erent across treatments for both task orderings (Price/Rank-
Choice,  2 = 59.239, df= 2, p < 0.0001; Choice-Price/Rank,  2 = 60.5983, df= 2, p < 0.0001).
To confirm that the di↵erences were between the ranking treatments and the control BDM2 treat-
ment, we conducted two-sided MWU tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction to account for mul-
tiple comparisons (p-values below are the adjusted values). Both ranking treatments generated
significantly lower predicted reversal rates than the BDM2 treatment (Rank-Framed Price/Rank-
Choice, z = 6.01, p < 0.0001; Rank-Framed Choice-Price/Rank, z = 5.75, p < 0.0001;
Rank-Unframed Price/Rank-Choice, z = 7.19, p < 0.0001; Rank-Unframed Choice-Price/Rank,
z = 7.25, p < 0.0001). The di↵erence in the rate of predicted reversals across both ranking
treatments was not significant for the Rank-Choice ordering (z =  0.81, p = 0.414), but for
the Choice-Rank ordering the rate of predicted reversals was significantly lower in the Rank-
14 Our experimental setup does not allow distinguishing between the scale compatibility hypothesis and ref-
erence dependence (Sugden, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2008; Lindsay, 2013) as an explanation for the overpricing of
$-bets. This is due to the fact that when asking subjects to think about their minimum selling price (be it in a
pricing or a framed ranking task) both e↵ects would be present whereas in an unframed ranking task both e↵ects
would be absent.
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Figure 4: Average reversal rate per individual in Experiment 2.
Note: Reversal rates for the Price/Rank-Choice (dark) and Choice-Price/Rank (light) orderings.
Error bars depict the 95 percent confidence interval.
Unframed treatment than in the Rank-Framed treatment (z =  2.29, p = 0.022). This last
result agrees with the idea that the Rank-Unframed treatment goes one step further in the
elimination of the overpricing process than a ranking-based but still price-framed approach.
Reversal of the standard reversal pattern. In the ranking treatments, the usual pattern of
reversals was reversed, with unpredicted reversals becoming more prominent than predicted ones
(Figure 4). Two-sided WSR tests confirm this observation. The rate of unpredicted reversals
is significantly higher than the rate of predicted reversal rates in both ranking treatments inde-
pendent of the task ordering (Rank-Framed Rank-Choice, N = 66, z = 3.47, p = 0.001; Rank-
Framed Choice-Rank, N = 66, z = 3.17, p = 0.002; Rank-Unframed Rank-Choice, N = 68,
z = 5.27, p < 0.0001; Rank-Unframed Choice-Rank, N = 66, z = 5.71, p < 0.001).
Order e↵ects (H4). In contrast to Experiment 1, we found no significant di↵erences in neither
the rate of unpredicted reversals (BDM2, N = 68, z = 0.918, p = 0.359; Rank-Framed, N = 66,
z = 0.235, p = 0.814; Rank-Unframed, N = 70, z =  0.474, p = 0.636) nor in the rate of
predicted reversals (BDM2, N = 69, z = 503, p = 0.615; Rank-Framed, N = 73, z = 0.453,
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p = 0.651; Rank-Unframed. N = 71, z = 1.479, p = 0.139) when prices were elicited after
choices compared to when they were elicited before choices.
Decision times and reversals (H2/H6). Figure 5 displays the decision times for reversals and
comparable non-reversals for all three treatments and both task orderings, comparing each type
of reversal with the appropriate non-reversals. Two-sided WSR tests confirmed that predicted
reversals involved longer decision times than comparable non-reversals, both for Price/Rank-
Choice and for Choice-Price/Rank, for all treatments. For both ranking treatments, the dif-
ferences were highly significant (Rank-Framed Rank-Choice, N = 42, z = 3.551, p < 0.0005;
Rank-Framed Choice-Rank, N = 45, z = 2.743, p = 0.006; Rank-Unframed Rank-Choice,
N = 43, z = 2.614, p = 0.009); Rank-Unframed Choice-Rank, N = 34, z = 3.163, p = 0.002).
This confirms that the decision times e↵ect predicted by our model, which is independent of
the overpricing assumption, is still present under ordinal (ranking) evaluation tasks. In the case
of the BDM2 treatment, the test missed significance for the Price-Choice ordering (N = 64,
z = 1.595, p = 0.111), but the di↵erence was significant for Choice-Price (N = 58, z = 3.004,
p = 0.003).
For both ranking treatments unpredicted reversals were again significantly slower than com-
parable non-reversals independently of task ordering (Rank-Framed Rank-Choice, N = 49,
z = 2.875, p = 0.004; Rank-Framed Choice-Rank, N = 45, z = 3.014, p = 0.003; Rank-
Unframed Rank-Choice, N = 49, z = 1.930, p = 0.054); Rank-Unframed Choice-Rank, N = 47,
z = 3.656, p < 0.0005). In the BDM2 treatment the decision time di↵erences were not significant
for the Price-Choice ordering (N = 30, z = 1.131, p = 0.258), but unpredicted reversals were
significantly slower for the Choice-Price ordering (N = 23, z = 1.992, p = 0.046).
Decision times and non-reversals (H3/H7). Treatment BDM2 successfully replicated the
finding that non-reversals are slower when the $-bet is chosen than when the P -bet is chosen,
as predicted in Hypothesis H3 (WSR tests; Price-Choice, N = 60, z = 1.984, p = 0.047;
Choice-Price, N = 58, z = 2.609, p = 0.009). However, for ranking treatments we expected no
di↵erences (Hypothesis H7). There is still a significant di↵erence for the Rank-Choice ordering
(Rank-Framed, N = 57, z = 1.835, p = 0.066; Rank-Unframed, N = 54, z = 1.825, p = 0.068),
but there is clearly no significant di↵erence for the classification according to the Choice-Rank
ordering (Rank-Framed, N = 55, z = 0.733, p = 0.463; Rank-Unframed, N = 48, z = 0.385,
p = 0.701). Figure 6 illustrates these results.
Decision times in the Rank-Unframed Treatment. All decisions in the Rank-Unframed treat-
ment were significantly quicker than in the other two treatments (Figures 5 and 6). The di↵er-
ence is substantial: the median decision time over all choices was 13.41 s in BDM2, 12.52 s in
Rank-Framed, and only 9.61 s in Rank-Unframed. This is remarkable, because the treatments
di↵ered only in the evaluation phases, and the choice phases in which the decision times were
measured were identical. We will discuss this observation in detail below.
A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed that decision times were significantly di↵erent across treat-
ments ( 2 = 35.545, df= 2, p < 0.0001). Two-sided MWU tests with Holm-Bonferroni cor-
rection to account for multiple comparisons showed that decisions were faster in the Rank-
Unframed treatment than in the other treatments (BDM2, z =  5.722, p < 0.0001; Rank-
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Figure 5: Average decision time per individual in the choice task in Experiment 2.
Note: Predicted reversals are compared to non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen, unpre-
dicted reversals to non-reversals where the $-bet was chosen. Error bars depict the 95 percent
confidence interval.
Framed, z =  4.225, p < 0.0001).15
15 The di↵erence between decision times in treatments Rank-Framed and BDM2 missed significance, z =
 1.596, p = 0.111.
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Figure 6: Average non-reversal decision time per individual in choice task of Experiment 2.
Note: Choices classified as non-reversals according to the indicated task ordering. Error bars
depict the 95 percent confidence interval.
4.5 Regression Analysis for Experiment 2
As for Experiment 1, we conducted a random-e↵ects panel regression analysis on the log of
decision times from Experiment 2. The objective was to confirm and clarify our results while
controlling for natural individual and lottery-pair characteristics; specifically, we included the
same controls as in Experiment 1.16 Table 2 contains the main results of all treatments. For each
treatment, in the first regression reversals are classified as such according to the Price/Rank-
Choice task ordering, while in the second one the Choice-Price/Rank is used. We present a
single regression for each treatment and task ordering, but the results are robust with respect
to the control variables.
Predicted reversals vs. non-reversals. The reversal dummies were highly significant in all
treatments and task orderings, except for the “noisiest” Price-Choice in Treatment BDM2.
This indicates that, as in Experiment 1, predicted reversals took longer than comparable non-
reversals, confirming Hypothesis H2a.
Unpredicted reversals vs. non-reversals. Hypothesis H2b states that unpredicted reversals
should take longer than non-reversals where the $-bet was chosen. The di↵erence corresponds to
 Reversal+ $ Choice⇥Reversal, which is indeed highly significant and positive in all four regressions
for the ranking treatments. The postestimation tests are not significant for the BDM2 treatment.
Comparison of non-reversals. The $-choice dummy is significant and positive for Treatment
BDM2. That is, as in Experiment 1, non-reversals where the $-bet was chosen took longer
than non-reversals where the P -bet was chosen in this treatment (Hypothesis H3). As stated
in Hypothesis H7, we expected this e↵ect to disappear for the purely ordinal, unframed treat-
ment Rank-Unframed. Indeed, the dummy is not significant in any of the regressions for this
treatment. The prediction is less clear for the “intermediate” treatment Rank-Framed, where
16 For the two ranking treatments, StatedDi↵-1 and StatedDi↵-3 refer to the di↵erence in stated ranks between
the two lotteries within a pair in phases 1 and 3, respectively.
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Table 2: Random-e↵ects panel regressions for decision times, Experiment 2.
Treatment BDM2 RankFramed RankUnframed
Order P-C C-P R-C C-R R-C C-R
ReversalPC 0.049 0.135⇤⇤⇤ 0.108⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.042) (0.044)
ReversalCP 0.100⇤⇤⇤ 0.155⇤⇤⇤ 0.199⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.043) (0.051)
$-Choice 0.072⇤⇤ 0.098⇤⇤⇤ 0.073⇤⇤ 0.062⇤ 0.030 -0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035)
$-Choice 0.026 0.014 0.014
⇥ReversalPC (0.069) (0.062) (0.061)
$-Choice 0.011 0.039 0.008
⇥ReversalCP (0.077) (0.064) (0.067)
Di↵EV -0.022⇤⇤ -0.020⇤ -0.026⇤⇤ -0.025⇤⇤ -0.013 -0.008
(0.031) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Ratio 0.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
StatedDi↵-1 -0.005 -0.004 -0.011 -0.014 -0.024⇤⇤ -0.026⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
StatedDi↵-3 -0.003 -0.005 -0.046⇤⇤⇤ -0.041⇤⇤⇤ -0.045⇤⇤⇤ -0.042⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Round -0.007⇤⇤⇤ -0.007⇤⇤⇤ -0.008⇤⇤⇤ -0.007⇤⇤⇤ -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.190⇤⇤ -0.181⇤⇤ -0.238⇤⇤⇤ -0.237⇤⇤⇤ -0.217⇤⇤ -0.212⇤⇤
(0.089) (0.087) (0.077) (0.077) (0.087) (0.085)
Position 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.030 0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Color 0.108 0.112 0.088 0.085 -0.034 -0.040
(0.087) (0.086) (0.077) (0.077) (0.085) (0.083)
Constant 2.624⇤⇤⇤ 2.595⇤⇤⇤ 2.649⇤⇤⇤ 2.645 2.391⇤⇤⇤ 2.388⇤⇤⇤
(0.095) (0.094) (0.087) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088)
Nr. Obs. 1242 1244 1314 1314 1314 1314
Nr. Groups 69 69 73 73 73 73
R2-Overall 0.066 0.069 0.128 0.140 0.104 0.122
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Postestimation tests
Reversal 0.075 0.111 0.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.194⇤⇤⇤ 0.121⇤⇤⇤ 0.207⇤⇤⇤
+($-Ch⇥Rev) (0.060) (0.068) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.041)
Note: All regressions are random-e↵ects panel estimations, with log decision time as dependent
variable. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.1.
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the evaluation task was also ordinal but there was an indirect framing in terms of prices.17 For
this treatment, the $-choice was significantly positive, but e.g. only at the 10% level for the
Choice-Rank ordering.
Controls: Lotteries. As in Experiment 1, the ratio of the two higher amounts to win in
the $-bet and the P -bet (Ratio) had a significant positive e↵ect throughout. Likewise, the
absolute di↵erence in expected values of the P -bet and the $-bet (Di↵EV) had a weakly sig-
nificant negative e↵ect, but not in the Rank-Unframed treatment. The absolute di↵erence in
the prices/ranks stated for the lotteries in phases one and three (StatedDi↵-1, StatedDi↵-3) was
significant for Rank-Unframed but not for BDM2 (and only the second measure was significant
for Rank-Framed).
Other controls. As in Experiment 1, we controlled for learning and familiarity e↵ects by
including the round in which the choice was made as a regressor. Also as in Experiment 1,
female participants were significantly quicker in all treatments and task orderings. The onscreen
position (Position) of the P -bet and the $-bet and the colors used in the pie-chart (Color) had,
as expected, no e↵ect.
4.6 Discussion of Experiment 2
The experiment successfully separated the two postulated determinants of reversals. On the
one hand, the almost-complete disappearance of predicted reversals in the ranking treatments
(especially when ordinally framed) confirms that the overpricing phenomenon can be shut down.
It also shows that this phenomenon appears due to the cardinal, rating-based frame used in
standard evaluation tasks as those employed in Experiment 1. On the other hand, the remaining
reversals are still associated with longer decision times (a prediction we derived from noisy
evaluations) even though the overpricing process has been impaired. This is evidence that both
noisy evaluations and the overpricing phenomenon need to be taken into account as di↵erent
ingredients in order to model preference reversals.
Concerning the elimination of reversals, our results are consistent with evidence from Bate-
man et al. (2007). These authors also observed a reduction in predicted preference reversal rates
in an experiment where lotteries were ranked within sets which also contained sure amounts.
Their ranking task is not directly comparable to ours because $-bets and P -bets were ranked
separately, i.e. within di↵erent sets, and the ranks of P -bets relative to $-bets were inferred
indirectly. Oliver (2013) used a similar method for the measurement of preferences in the health
domain (life expectancy).
Our main object of study have been predicted preference reversals, since they are empiri-
cally more relevant. The compatibility hypothesis points to an overpricing phenomenon as a
reason for the predominance of these reversals, while the origin of unpredicted ones might be
just noisy evaluations. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that the rate of unpredicted
reversals increased in the ranking treatments with respect to the control (BDM2) treatment.
In fact, our ranking treatments reversed the usual pattern of preference reversals turning un-
17 We consider the framing “indirect” because, contrary to the tasks in Experiment 1 or Treatment BDM2,
participants did not actually write down prices.
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predicted reversals into the dominant ones. We hypothesize that, when the cues on which the
overpricing process acts are removed, attention is diverted to probabilities instead. Following
the compatibility hypothesis, this would result in an over-evaluation of P -bets, for which a high
probability is salient. However, this process is weaker than the one causing overpricing of $-
bets with pricing frames, simply because monetary rewards are a more immediately accessible
concept than probabilities. Thus, in a standard preference-reversal study, this second process is
overshadowed by the overpricing of $-bets. Our evidence in this respect is consistent with Cubitt
et al. (2004), where the rate of unpredicted reversals increased when subjects were asked for
“probabilistic valuations” instead of prices, trying to induce a probability anchor. However, the
rates of predicted reversals remained relatively high, suggesting that such valuation tasks, being
still cardinal, do not completely remove the salience of monetary outcomes.18 Casey (1991,
1994) observed a higher rate of unpredicted reversals compared to predicted ones using very
high payo↵s and maximum buying prices (rather than minimum selling prices). Again, however,
predicted reversal rates remained comparatively high. Casey (1994) argues that high stakes
might induce buyers to anchor on the smallest monetary outcome of a lottery, adjusting the
valuation upwards on the basis of probabilities, and hence resulting in an overpricing of P-bets.
In our terms, the setting of Casey (1991, 1994) might correspond to a combination of elements
enhancing the second process mentioned above. If such a second process is assumed, the increase
of unpredicted reversals in our ranking treatments, in Cubitt et al. (2004), and in Casey (1991,
1994) can be explained within our model. One could argue that in a ranking task there is,
for whatever the reason, a tendency to “over-rank” the P -bet. Versions of our Propositions 1
and 2 would then yield a higher rate of unpredicted reversals as well as the observed decision
time pattern for reversals. This, however, would not explain the fact that $-bet non-reversal
choices still take (weakly) longer that P -bet non-reversal choices in the ranking treatments. The
latter observation might point towards a possible “over-ranking” of P -bets being guided by a
fundamentally di↵erent process than the overpricing of $-bets.
As a remark, we observe order e↵ects on decision times (similar to those already seen in
Experiment 1) that are compatible with the view that post-choice elicitation tasks carry less
noise than pre-choice analogues, possibly due to “preference sharpening” or reappraisal in the
sense of self-perception theory.
4.7 Why Are Choices After Rankings Quicker? A Dual-Process Explanation
An important observation is that decision times in Treatment Rank-Unframed were significantly
shorter than those in other treatments, with the di↵erence being also rather large (see Figures 5
and 6). This is striking, because the choice phase in all our treatments was identical. Actually,
this di↵erence was expected, and the reasons have to be sought in (psychological) theories of
decision processes.19
18 Participants were asked for the probability p making them indi↵erent between a given lottery and receiving
a fixed, high monetary outcome X with probability p. Hence monetary outcomes remained an important part of
the frame.
19 We present this discussion after the fact for readability reasons only. For a detailed discussion of decision
times and conflicting decision processes under risk and uncertainty, see Achtziger and Alo´s-Ferrer (2014).
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We focus on dual-process models from psychology (Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Evans, 2008;
Weber and Johnson, 2009; Alo´s-Ferrer and Strack, 2014), which postulate that decisions are
the result of the interaction of possibly conflicting decision processes of di↵erent types. A basic
prediction of dual-process models is that the detection of conflict among decision processes and
its resolution consume both time and cognitive resources. That is, decision times are longer when
several processes conflict than when processes are aligned. In particular, this is independent of
how the conflict is resolved, i.e. which decision is actually made and which process determines
this decision.
In our framework, the compatibility hypothesis suggests that several decision processes might
be at work when choosing from a pair of lotteries. Overpricing might result from a process
focusing on monetary outcomes only, which competes with a more global decision process that
evaluates lotteries by taking both outcomes and winning probabilities into account. Clearly,
the former process is activated by a monetary frame in the initial evaluation phase (pricing)
and will be especially prevalent during lottery evaluation. If activated, this decision process
remains active during the subsequent choice phase, but there it is often inhibited, which leads to
a choice causing a preference reversal. The resulting process conflict results in increased decision
times. In the Treatment Rank-Unframed, we removed all references to prices, and hence the
overpricing process was simply not activated at all. Hence, there was no process conflict, and no
additional time was spent in conflict resolution in the choice phase. It is interesting to observe
that in the Treatment Rank-Framed, where the evaluation task was also ordinal but the frame
made a reference to prices, decision times were closer to those of the rating treatments, even
though predicted reversals were also greatly reduced. Again, the interpretation is simple. The
price frame generally activated the process behind overpricing, but the fact that the task was
ultimately a purely ordinal one made it less likely that this process actually shaped the decision
in the evaluation tasks, hence reducing reversals. However, since the process had been activated,
it needed to be inhibited in the choice phase, causing longer decision times.
This explanation does not a↵ect our other predictions. Essentially, it means that decision
times in the choice task, DT , consist of two components, choice time DTC and conflict resolution
time DTR, i.e. DT = DTC + DTR, where DTR is larger in the presence of process conflict.
Within each experimental treatment, there are no large variations in DTR, and hence none of
the predictions are a↵ected.
Two comments are in order. First, it is conceivable that some non-reversals correspond to
cases where the overpricing process is not activated. This would lead to the additional assump-
tion that, within a treatment, conflict resolution time is larger for reversals than for comparable
non-reversals.20 This more detailed account would leave our other hypotheses una↵ected, be-
cause H1/H5 do not concern decision times, and do not concern reversals. Hypothesis H4 on
order e↵ects is likewise orthogonal to this question. The additional assumption would a↵ect
exclusively the interpretation of Hypotheses H2/H7, i.e. that reversals take longer than com-
parable nonreversals. However, Proposition 2 states that choice times are longer for reversals
20 Such an assumption would also capture the observation that preference reappraisal and process conflict
resolution in the Free-Choice Paradigm occur during the choice phase, as observed in fMRI (Jarcho et al., 2011)
and response time studies (Alo´s-Ferrer et al., 2012).
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than for non-reversals. The new assumption would state that also conflict resolution time is on
average larger for reversals. Since total decision time is now viewed as the sum of choice time
and conflict resolution time, Hypotheses H2/H7 would remain una↵ected.
Second, dual-process theories postulate that decision processes can range from automatic
and fast, corresponding to quick heuristics, to controlled and slow. Although inessential for
our analysis, it is interesting to speculate on the nature of the decision processes involved in
preference reversals. Clearly, a decision process reflecting global valuation considerations should
be conceptualized as a cognitive, controlled process. It would be reasonable to assume that the
overpricing process is more automatic (quicker) than the former process. Our results suggest,
however, that it cannot be a purely impulsive process with very low response times. If this were
the case, then in case of conflict some decisions would actually be made by the impulsive process
and be correspondingly far quicker. This would reduce the average decision time, operating in
the opposite direction to the e↵ect discussed above. Our data make clear that this process is
not quick enough for this second-order consideration to o↵set the reduction of conflict resolution
time.
5 Conclusion
We investigated decision times in the choice task of two preference reversal experiments to
deepen our understanding of the actual decision processes behind preference reversals. Our
main hypotheses separate the reasons for the existence of reversals and for the predominance of
predicted reversals on the basis of two prominent accounts from the literature. While the exis-
tence of reversals is attributed to noise (imprecise preferences) in the evaluation phase (Schmidt
and Hey, 2004; Butler and Loomes, 2007), the predominance of predicted reversals is the re-
sult of an overpricing phenomenon of lotteries with salient monetary outcomes associated with
the compatibility hypothesis (Tversky et al., 1988, 1990). A noisy evaluation phase suggests
that choices involved in preference reversals are more likely to include comparisons where de-
cision makers are closer to indi↵erence. Since decision times associated with such hard choices
have been shown to take longer than easy choices where one option is clearly better (Wilcox,
1993; Shultz et al., 1999; Mo↵att, 2005; Chabris et al., 2009; Sharot et al., 2009; Alo´s-Ferrer
et al., 2012), choices involved in preferences reversals should take longer than corresponding
non-reversal choices.
The first experiment confirmed these hypotheses. We reproduced the standard preference
reversal pattern and found that reversals were clearly associated with longer decision times. In
the second experiment, we were able to shut down the overpricing process by moving away from
cardinal-based evaluation phases to purely ordinal ranking tasks, which e↵ectively separates
the consequences of the two postulated determinants of reversals. As expected, we observe a
significant reduction of predicted reversals. More importantly, reversal choices still take longer
than non-reversal choices, a prediction derived from imprecise preferences only. These findings
are compatible with the idea that reversals arise due to an interaction of noise in the evaluation
phases and a psychological process (or set thereof) causing an overpricing of lotteries with a
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salient monetary outcome.
In addition, we found that a complete removal of cues to prices in the evaluation phase
notably reduces decision times in the choice task. This observation is remarkable insofar as we
employ two otherwise identical ranking tasks that only di↵er in the experimental instructions. In
one treatment (Rank-Framed) participants are instructed to think about minimum selling prices
and rank lotteries accordingly, in the other (Rank-Unframed) there is no mentioning of prices
at all. Thinking about minimum selling prices in the evaluation phase significantly increases
decision times in the choice phase. This finding is compatible with standard psychological
insights on process conflict and provides further support towards the existence of an overpricing
process triggered by price cues.
Our design further allowed us to evaluate di↵erent experimental possibilities with regard to
the amount of noise they induce. By using two evaluation phases, one pre-choice and one post-
choice, we are able to conclude that post-choice evaluation tasks are in general more appropriate
for preference elicitation, in accordance with evidence on preference reappraisal from psychology.
By using di↵erent evaluation tasks across treatments, we conclude that tasks based on the BDM
procedure might add additional, unwanted noise and other tasks, as e.g. the Ordinal Payment
Method, might be more accurate. Finally, if one is interested in preferences rather than certainty
equivalents, our second experiment shows that the more accurate evaluation method (in the
sense of inducing fewer reversals) is to rely on purely ordinal, ranking-based tasks without any
references to prices.
Our research investigated the mechanisms and processes behind the preference reversal phe-
nomenon. Previous research (see e.g. Cubitt et al., 2004) has pointed out that a combination
of psychological mechanisms might be the simplest explanation of the phenomenon. Given the
fundamental importance of preference elicitation methods for both decision theory and applied
economics, and the amount of attention dedicated to the preference reversal phenomenon in the
last half century, we believe that fleshing out these mechanisms is an important step. At the same
time, we show that a parsimonious combination of insights from the literature with standard
facts on decision times can account for received evidence and provide new, testable hypotheses
allowing us to better understand the determinants of the preference reversal phenomenon.
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1
A Proofs
Throughout the appendix, let  ⇣ = ⇣P   ⇣$ + K. Under Assumption 3, ⇣P and ⇣$ are i.i.d.
and unimodal, implying that  ⇣ is symmetrically distributed around 0 and unimodal (cf.
Purkayastha, 1998, Theorem 2.1).
Proof of Proposition 1. We first claim that the probability of a predicted reversal Pr(CE$ >
CEP , C(P, $) = P ) is higher than the probability of an unpredicted reversal Pr(CEP >
CE$, C(P, $) = $). Since K > 0 by Assumption 3, Pr( ⇣ <  K   s) < Pr( ⇣ < K   s)
for all s 2 [0,1[ and the conclusion follows from the following computations.
Pr(CE$ > CEP , C(P, $) = P )
=
Z 1
0
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP   u$ = s)h(s)ds =
Z 1
0
Pr( ⇣ < K   s)h(s)ds
Pr(CEP > CE$, C(P, $) = $) =
Z 1
0
Pr(CEP > CE$|u$   uP = s)h(s)ds
=
Z 1
0
Pr( ⇣ > K + s)h(s)ds =
Z 1
0
Pr( ⇣ <  K   s)h(s)ds.
This proves the claim.
Note that Pr(CE$ > CEP |c(P, $) = P ) = Pr(CE$>CEP ,c(P,$)=P )Pr(uP>u$) , and Pr(CEP > CE$|c(P, $) =
$) = Pr(CEP>CE$,c(P,$)=$)Pr(u$>uP ) . Since Pr(uP > u$) = Pr(u$ > uP ), the conclusion follows from the
claim. ⌅
The next lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the following hold.
(i) Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 < uP   u$ <  ) > Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP   u$ >  ).
(ii) Pr(CEP > CE$|0 < u$   uP <  ) > Pr(CEP > CE$|u$   uP >  ).
Proof. We prove part (i). The proof of part (ii) is analogous. We have Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP u$ =
s) = Pr( ⇣ < K   s) and
Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 < uP u$ <  ) = 1Pr(0 < uP   u$ <  )
Z  
0
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP u$ = s)h(s)ds
>
1
Pr(0 < uP   u$ <  )
Z  
0
Pr( ⇣ < K    )h(s)ds = Pr( ⇣ < K    ).
Similarly Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP   u$ = s) = Pr( ⇣ < K   s) and
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP   u$ >  ) = 1Pr(uP   u$ >  )
Z 1
 
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP   u$ = s)h(s)ds
<
1
Pr(uP   u$ >  )
Z 1
 
Pr( ⇣ < K    )h(s)ds = Pr( ⇣ < K    )
and the conclusion follows. ⌅
2
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) To shorten notation let  0 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 < uP   u$ <  ),
 1 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP   u$ >  ), P   = Pr(0 < uP   u$ <  |0 < uP   u$), and P =
Pr(CE$ > CEP |uP > u$).
With these definitions, P =  0P   + 1(1  P  ). We obtain E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) =
P ] = 1P [ 0P
 TH+ 1(1 P  )TE ], and E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ] = 11 P [(1  0)P  TH+
(1  1)(1  P  )TE ]. A simple calculation shows that
E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = P ] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ]
, P  TH [ 0   P ] > (1  P  )TE [P   1]
As P =  0P  + 1(1 P  ), we obtain  0 P = (1 P  )( 0  1) and P   1 = P  ( 0  1).
Hence E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = P ] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ] holds if and only
if TH( 0    1) > TE( 0    1). By Lemma 1(i),  0 >  1 and hence the inequality holds if
and only if TH > TE , which is true by Assumption 4.
(ii) is analogous to (i), using part (ii) of Lemma 1 instead of (i). ⌅
The next lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 2. Pr(0 < uP   u$ <  |0 < uP   u$) = Pr(0 < u$   uP <  |0 < u$   uP ).
Proof. First note that since uP and u$ are i.i.d, uP   u$ and u$  uP are identically distributed
and Pr(u$   uP > 0) = Pr(u$   uP < 0) = 1/2. Then Pr(0 < u$   uP <  |0 < u$   uP ) =
Pr(0<u$ uP< )
Pr(u$>uP )
= Pr(0<uP u$< )Pr(uP>u$) = Pr(0 < uP   u$ <  |0 < uP   u$). ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3. To shorten notation let  0 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |0 < u$   uP <  ),
 1 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |u$  uP >  ),  2 = Pr(CEP > CE$|0 < uP   u$ <  ),  3 = Pr(CEP >
CE$|uP   u$ >  ), P1 = Pr(CE$ > CEP |u$ > uP ), P2 = Pr(CEP > CE$|uP > u$). Let also
P   be the probability given in Lemma 2.
With these definitions, we have that P1 =  0P   + 1(1 P  ) and P2 =  2P   + 3(1 P  ).
We obtain E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = $] = 1P1 [ 0P  TH+ 1(1 P  )TE ] and E[DTC |CEP >
CE$, c(P, $) = P ] =
1
P2
[ 2P  TH + 3(1  P  )TE ]. This yields.
E[DTC |CE$ > CEP , c(P, $) = $] > E[DTC |CEP > CE$, c(P, $) = P ]
, P  (1  P  )TH [ 0 3   1 2] > (1  P  )P  TE [ 0 3   1 2]
Since TH > TE by Assumption 4, the claim holds if  1 2 <  0 3. The rest of the proof is
devoted to establish this fact. For this, we rely on ideas taken from Wijsman (1985).
First, note that
 0 =
1
Pr(0 < u$   uP <  )
Z  
0
Pr( ⇣ < K + s)h(s)ds,
 1 =
1
Pr(u$   uP >  )
Z 1
 
Pr( ⇣ < K + s)h(s)ds,
 2 =
1
Pr(0 < up   u$ <  )
Z  
0
Pr( ⇣ <  K + s)h(s)ds, and
 3 =
1
Pr(uP   u$ >  )
Z 1
 
Pr( ⇣ <  K + s)h(s)ds.
3
Now let f1(s) := Pr( ⇣ < K + s), f2(s) = Pr( ⇣ <  K + s),
g1(s) =
8<:h(s) if s 2] ,1[,0 otherwise, and g2(s) =
8<:h(s) if s 2 [0,  ],0 otherwise.
As u$ and uP are i.i.d Pr(0 < u$   uP <  ) = Pr(0 < uP   u$ <  ) and Pr(u$   uP >  ) =
Pr(uP   u$ >  ) and hence showing that  1 2 <  0 3 boils down to showing thatZ 1
0
f1(s)g1(s)ds
Z 1
0
f2(s)g2(s)ds <
Z 1
0
f2(s)g1(s)ds
Z 1
0
f1(s)g2(s)ds.
To see that this is true note that
2
✓Z 1
0
f1(s)g1(s)ds
Z 1
0
f2(s)g2(s)ds 
Z 1
0
f2(s)g1(s)ds
Z 1
0
f1(s)g2(s)ds
◆
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
F (x, y)G(x, y)dxdy,
where F (x, y) = f1(x)f2(y)  f1(y)f2(x) and G(x, y) = g1(x)g2(y)  g1(y)g2(x). Further,✓
f1
f2
◆0
(s) =
q(K + s)Pr( ⇣ <  K + s)  Pr( ⇣ < K + s)q( K + s)
(Pr( ⇣ <  K + s))2 ,
where q is the density of  ⇣. Then (f1f2 )
0(s) < 0 since 0 < q(K + s)  q( K + s) and Pr( ⇣ <
 K + s) < Pr( ⇣ < K + s) by Assumption 3.1 Thus f1f2 is strictly decreasing and hence
F (x, y) > 0 if x < y and F (x, y) < 0 if y < x (of course, F (x, y) = 0 if x = y). By construction
G(x, y) > 0 if (x, y) 2] ,1[⇥[0,  ], G(x, y) < 0 if (x, y) 2 [0,  ]⇥] ,1[, andG(x, y) = 0 otherwise.
Hence F (x, y)G(x, y)  0 for all (x, y) 2 R+ ⇥ R+ and F (x, y)G(x, y) < 0 for all (x, y) 2
] ,1[⇥[0,  ] [ [0,  ]⇥] ,1[. This implies that R10 R10 F (x, y)G(x, y)dxdy < 0 which proves the
claim. ⌅
1The fact that q(K + s)  q( K + s) follows by unimodality. If s   K then q( K + s)  q(K + s) since q is
nonincreasing in the positive domain. If s < K then q( K + s) > q( K   s) = q(K + s) since q is nondecreasing
in the negative domain and symmetric.
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B Lotteries
Table 1: The lottery pairs.
Lottery P-bet $-bet
pair Prob Outc EV StdDev Prob Outc EV StdDev
1 0.44 7 4.20 3.536 0.36 7 3.80 3.536
2 0.40 8 4.40 4.243 0.40 7 4.00 3.536
3 0.82 11 9.38 6.364 0.10 48 6.60 32.527
4 0.94 9 8.58 4.950 0.20 30 7.60 19.799
5 0.80 11 9.20 6.364 0.20 24 6.40 15.556
6 0.90 10 9.20 5.657 0.30 22 8.00 14.142
7 0.60 15 9.80 9.192 0.21 23 6.41 14.849
8 0.80 10 8.40 5.656 0.40 15 7.20 9.192
9 0.89 6 5.56 2.828 0.11 36 5.74 24.042
10 0.81 6 5.24 2.828 0.19 18 5.04 11.314
11 0.97 12 11.70 7.071 0.31 34 11.92 22.627
12 0.94 8 7.64 4.242 0.39 16 7.46 9.899
13 0.82 9 7.74 4.243 0.50 13 7.50 7.778
14 0.87 7 6.35 3.536 0.50 11 6.50 6.364
15 0.68 7 5.40 2.828 0.20 25 6.60 16.971
16 0.79 8 6.74 2.828 0.30 24 8.60 15.556
17 0.80 6 5.20 2.828 0.40 18 8.40 11.314
18 0.90 6 5.60 2.828 0.30 18 6.80 11.314
19 0.60 9 6.20 4.950 0.45 17 8.75 10.607
20 0.60 10 6.80 5.657 0.40 16 7.60 9.899
Note: Each lottery pays an amount of e2 with the remaining probability.
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C Screenshots
(a) Pricing phase (Experiment 1)
(b) Ranking phase (Experiment 2)
(c) Choice phase (Experiments 1 and 2)
Figure 1: Screenshots for pricing, ranking and choice task.
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